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RESPONSE TO PROFESSOR GROSS: TAKING
THE INTERESTS OF THE COMMUNITY INTO
ACCOUNT IN BANKRUPTCY-A MODERN-DAY
TALE OF BELLING THE CAT
HON. BARRY S. SCHERMER*
I. INTRODUCTION
William Langland inspired the famous children's story involving a group
of mice who one day meet to complain about the hunting success of a local
cat and to discuss some possible solutions to prevent future rodent deaths.'
One mouse, feeling that he has the solution, suggests that their survival
chances would increase dramatically if they simply put a bell around the
neck of the cat. The support for this idea quickly dissipates, however,
when an older mouse-well-versed in the dilemma of individual sacrifice
and group survival-asks a very obvious yet poignant question: "Who is
to bell the cat?"
Professor Gross' proposal to take community interests into account in
bankruptcy is reminiscent of the proposal to bell the cat. Both suggestions
present a solution on the theoretical level, but both are certain to fail in
their application because they do not consider present realities. The
community interest argument fails on three fronts: definition, application,
and the role of the decisionmaker. After a short illustration, each
shortcoming will be addressed in turn.
II. IDENTIFYING, APPLYING, AND CHOOSING THE DECISIONMAKER FOR
COMMUNITY INTERESTS
A. Identifying the Problem
The community interest issue often arises in the context of the § 363
sale' of either substantially all of the estate's assets, or an entire business
* Hon. Barry S. Schermer, Chief United States Bankruptcy Judge, Eastern District of Missouri.
The author gratefully acknowledges the efforts and assistance given him by his Law Clerk, Darrell W.
Clark, in preparation of this comment.
1. WILLIAM LANGLAND, THE VISION OF PIERS PLOWMAN 7-8 (Henry W. Wells trans., Sheed &
Ward 1935) (n.d.).
2. A sale of most or all of a debtor's assets would constitute a sale out of the ordinary course
of business pursuant to I 1 U.S.C. § 363(b) (1988).
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division. Consider the following example:
The Debtor is a Hat Manufacturing Company operating in State A. The
Debtor wants to sell all of its tangible personal property, which consists of
manufacturing and office equipment, to Other Hat Company also located in
State A. At the auction, Big Hat Company, a hat manufacturer from State
B, is the high bidder. Big Hat wants to shut down the Debtor's plant and
move all of the business assets to State B.3
Here the court is asked to make a choice between two competing proposals.
One bidder is offering to keep the business open and operating. Individuals
in the local community will keep their jobs and the local municipality will
continue to collect tax revenue from the Debtor. The other bidder is a
competitor offering a higher price, who will shut down the business and
eliminate the competition.
Under our present system, there is no dilemma in resolving the preceding
example. "The fundamental purpose of a sale of debtor's assets is to
benefit creditors."4 A bankruptcy court need only look at the money that
a proposed sale will generate and make its decision based upon the
potential return for the creditors. These decisions are made without
consideration of loss of local jobs, loss of a regional business, or loss of tax
revenue.
Professor Gross argues that the bankruptcy judge should consider the
community interests in the above example. Although she admits that
community interests could never be measured in economic terms, "that does
not mean ... that they lack value."5 Yet, it is the very fact that communi-
ty interests cannot be measured that helps to defeat any argument that they
should be applied in a bankruptcy court. While some articulated communi-
ty interests may be valuable, the bankruptcy court is not the appropriate
forum for defining, applying, and considering community interests.
B. Identifying the Community and the Interest
How does a federal judge determine a community interest? The first
task, of course, would be to designate the community, but even this initial
step appears impossible. If a community were viewed in geographic terms,
it would be altogether inappropriate for a court of the United States to
prefer the interests of the citizens in one state over the interests of the
citizens in another state. This is inconsistent with principles of federalism,
3. See generally In re Benay-Albee Novelty Co., 146 B.R. 680 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992).
4. Id. at 680.
5. Karen Gross, Taking Community Interests into Account in Bankruptcv: An Essay, 72 WASH.
U. L.Q. 1031, 1046 (1994).
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and it serves to contradict the intent behind an Article I Court.
Geographical boundaries aside, a community may be as broad as the
asserted community interest. However, it is also impossible to delineate the
community in this fashion because there are an infinite number of
community interests at stake in each bankruptcy and their boundaries are
limitless. If, for example, the community interest were defined as that
portion of the citizenry that is affected by a debtor's business, the breadth
of the community could reach a potentially infinite number, since almost
anyone, from local employee to distant supplier, can claim some remote
loss due to the failure of a once-viable local business. The Bankruptcy
Code solves this problem by limiting those who can claim that they are
affected by the bankruptcy because it makes entitlement to money or
contract rights the criteria for consideration in the decisionmaking process.
The broad standing provisions of 11 U.S.C. § 1109 and Federal Rule of
Bankruptcy Procedure 2018 further define those involved in a bankruptcy
proceeding. Under these provisions, the SEC, any creditor, and any state's
attorney general (acting for consumer creditors) can be heard in the
proceeding. Professor Gross' proposal goes beyond these provisions and
opens up a Pandora's box of possible "claimants" without offering any
solutions as to how this potentially vast group could be limited.6
Thus, the problem is not that community interests cannot be identified,
but that there are so many potential interests in every bankruptcy. Whether
the community interest is minority employment, local jobs, tax revenue, or
environmental concerns, a major problem with Professor Gross' theory is
the plethora of potential interests and the extent to which consideration for
these interests should extend when the decisionmaker is a federal court.
C. The Obstacle of Application
Even if some community interest could be articulated, there is a problem
with application. When dollars and contract entitlements are not the
criteria, there is no adequate medium to consider community interests vis-a-
vis monetary interests, or even among competing community interests.
In the Hat Manufacturer bankruptcy example cited above, suppose that
the bankruptcy judge were faced with a choice between two competing
bids. One bid, Option 1, would pay all secured creditors in full and all
unsecured creditors fifty cents on the dollar. Another bid, Option 2, would
promise little return for the creditors, but would boost minority employment
and would provide funding for cleaning up some environmental problems
6. One could even take this a step further and question how notice of hearing could be sent to
a community comprised of an infinite number of "affected" community members.
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caused by the Debtor. Here, the bankruptcy judge is forced to choose
between these two bids without a medium of exchange that will permit the
judge to weigh adequately the relative value of each option.
This obstacle to applying community interests in decisionmaking
becomes even more acute when the community interests are competing
against each other. How does a bankruptcy court weigh a local
community's interest in maintaining its job base against potential long-term
environmental damage? A bankruptcy court cannot make this determina-
tion because there is no common medium for weighing these interests, and
because a bankruptcy court should not be the decisionmaker for any
community interest analysis.
D. Choosing the Appropriate Decisionmaker
Professor Gross emphasizes the need to view the world as interconnect-
ed, with the welfare of the community being very much a part of corporate
bankruptcy.7 In addition to the problems of defining the scope of both the
community and the community interest, and weighing those interests in the
traditional bankruptcy context, there is also considerable difficulty in
placing these responsibilities in the hands of a bankruptcy judge.
When the judge is to make the decision regarding appropriate community
interests, he is invited to make decisions based on his own view as to what
is best for the community. Rather than rely on an objective and predictable
standard, i.e., money and contract rights, one individual would be permitted
to decide what should and what should not be considered a community
problem. In making these broad policy decisions, the judiciary would risk
involvement in intensely politicized decisions and would step on the toes
of elected legislators who, under our Constitution, are charged with
developing public policy by identifying and responding to the interests of
the public.
A judge who decides an issue based on a perceived community interest
may also face appellate review based purely on policy, rather than legal,
grounds. Furthermore, as each community is comprised of different
individuals, each community may not place the same weight on similar
community interests. These differing viewpoints would result in a
breakdown in our system of stare decisis-similar legal issues embodying
identical community interests would not be decided consistently because
one judge weighs one community interest, e.g., the spotted owl, more
heavily than another community interest, e.g., local jobs.
7. Gross, supra note 5, at 1042-43.
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III. CONCLUSION
Rather than creating a system which is fairer to more people, Professor
Gross advocates a position that is unworkable because it fails to consider
the realities of our legal and political systems. In attacking the assumptions
underlying our present economic organization, she proposes a sweeping
new vision without reflecting on the necessary details. Her purported
feminist methodology-focusing on the particular, on context, and on real
people and real situationss-may require more fine tuning before it can be
applied in bankruptcy. In short, her ideas on taking community interests
into account in bankruptcy bear yet another similarity with Langland's story
of "belling the cat"--both are good fiction.
S. Gross, supra note 5, at 1037.
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